Supply chain ⛓ Supply Chain

UNC6426 nx npm Supply Chain → AWS Admin Takeover (72 Hours)

📅 2026-03-01 🏢 nx (npm build tool); AWS; GitHub Actions OIDC
Primary Source ↗

Incident Details

In March 2026, UNC6426 demonstrated a sophisticated attack chain converting a stolen developer GitHub Personal Access Token (from the 2025 nx npm supply chain compromise) into full AWS administrator access within 72 hours. The threat actor used the Nord Stream tool to extract secrets from CI/CD environments, then abused the GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust relationship to generate temporary AWS STS tokens for the victim’s ‘Actions-CloudFormation’ IAM role. UNC6426 then created a new IAM role with AdministratorAccess attached. With full AWS admin access, the attacker enumerated and accessed S3 buckets, terminated production EC2 and RDS instances, decrypted application keys, renamed all victim GitHub repositories to ‘/s1ngularity-repository-[randomchars]’ and made them public. The incident illustrates how OIDC trust chain abuse can amplify the impact of npm supply chain credential theft far beyond the original package compromise.

Technical Details

Initial Attack Vector
UNC6426 leveraged credentials (GitHub Personal Access Token) stolen during the 2025 nx npm package supply chain compromise to abuse GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust, escalating from a developer PAT to full AWS AdministratorAccess within 72 hours
Vendor / Product
nx (npm build tool); AWS; GitHub Actions OIDC
Software Package
nx
Supply Chain Attack
✅ Confirmed third-party / vendor compromise

Timeline

  1. 2026-03-01 Breach occurred
  2. 2026-03-11 Publicly disclosed