Supply chain

Dickey's Barbecue Pit POS Malware Breach — 3M Cards on Joker's Stash (2019–2020)

📅 2019-07-01 🏢 Not disclosed 🦠 POS memory-scraping malware (specific family not disclosed)
Primary Source ↗

Incident Details

Dickey’s Barbecue Pit, a Dallas-based smoked-meat restaurant chain with approximately 469 locations across the United States, suffered a prolonged point-of-sale (POS) malware compromise that resulted in the theft of payment card data from roughly 156 locations across 30 states. The stolen data — over three million payment card records — was posted for sale on the Joker’s Stash dark web carding marketplace in October 2020 under the label “BlazingSun.”

The compromise is estimated to have begun around July 2019 and continued through at least August 2020, representing a dwell time of over 13 months. Multiple financial institutions confirmed to Krebs on Security that cards offered in the BlazingSun batch were all used at Dickey’s BBQ locations during that window. Cards were advertised with “valid rates” of 90–100%, indicating freshness, and sold at a median price of $17 per card.

The root technical cause was POS memory-scraping malware installed on in-store payment terminals. Dickey’s used outdated magnetic stripe (magstripe) payment technology at affected locations, which is vulnerable to track data harvesting by RAM-scraping POS malware. EMV chip card processing would have prevented this class of attack by replacing static track data with dynamic cryptograms. The most affected states were California and Arizona, accounting for a disproportionate share of the 156 compromised locations.

KrebsOnSecurity first contacted Dickey’s on October 13, 2020; the company acknowledged awareness of “a possible payment card security incident at some of its eateries” that same day. The POS provider or third-party vendor responsible for maintaining the payment systems was not named in public disclosures, which is why the vendor_product field remains undisclosed. The intrusion pathway — whether through direct compromise of the restaurant’s network, a POS vendor’s remote management infrastructure, or physical tampering — was not publicly detailed.

This breach followed a pattern common to restaurant chains: attackers target franchise POS systems, often through compromised remote desktop (RDP) credentials used by POS service providers, and deploy persistent memory-scrapers that silently harvest payment card track data over many months. The long dwell time and wide geographic spread across franchise locations are consistent with a centrally managed POS vendor compromise rather than location-by-location attacks.

Technical Details

Initial Attack Vector
Point-of-sale (POS) malware installed on in-store payment systems; likely facilitated by remote access compromise or supply chain intrusion into POS provider
Vendor / Product
Not disclosed
Malware Family
POS memory-scraping malware (specific family not disclosed)

Timeline

  1. 2019-07-01 Breach occurred
  2. 2020-10-13 Publicly disclosed